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THE ENGlISH RIOTS OF SUMMER 2011
CAN AN ETHNOCUlTURAl PERSPECTIVE BE JUSTIFIED?1
The aim of the paper is to analyse the English riots of summer 2011 and reflect 
on the questions of race and ethnicity – will they add significantly to our un-
derstanding of these events? The paper presents the timeline of social unrest, 
its dominant actors and events (starting from the manifestation organized by 
Mark Duggan’s family and friends), as well as the main theoretical themes and 
analytical perspectives present in British debate on the riots. The author argues 
that while the ethnocultural perspective cannot be seen as a leading one, in order 
to properly understand the events of August 2011 the links to previous riots and 
the history of racial tensions between police and members of certain communi-
ties should be unfolded and explored.
Keywords: English riots, race, ethnicity
1 This article was supported by funding from the Jagiellonian University within the SET project. The 
project is co -financed by the European Union.
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The structure of the paper is as follows: first, the author presents the general context of the English “riots” that happened in the summer of 2011, with the overview of 
the main actors, places, and events. Secondly, the paper covers the summary of the main 
theoretical frameworks and lenses through which these social disturbances have been 
analysed. Finally, the question of applicability of an ethnocultural perspective includ-
ing issues of race2 and ethnicity is addressed.
THE EVENTS OF SUMMER 2011
The event that triggered social unrest was the death of Mark Duggan, shot by police 
in Tottenham Hale, London, on Thursday, 4 August 20113 during a failed attempt to 
arrest him. The incident was subsequently reported to the Independent Police Com-
plaints Commission (IPCC).4 It is generally5 believed that the police mishandled this 
case, not only neglecting to inform family about his death before the media did so,6 but 
also being unable to properly react to the initially peaceful manifestation organized by 
Duggan’s friends on Saturday, 6 August. The protesters demanded to be met by the 
senior officer and were unsatisfied with the police representatives present on the spot. 
2 The paper does not cover the complexity of the concept of race (compare M. Kułakowska, ‘Kategorie 
“etniczności” oraz “rasy”’ in Ł. Krzyżowski, S. Urbańska (eds.), Mozaiki przestrzeni transnarodowych. 
Teorie, metody, zjawiska, Kraków 2010), taking it to be a social construct, yet with a significant social 
impact, especially in the British context. 
3 5 Days in August. An Interim report on the English riots, Riots Communities and Victims Panel, 
London 2011, pp. 40 -41, at <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121003195935/http:/
riotspanel.independent.gov.uk/wp -content/uploads/2012/04/Interim -report -5 -Days -in -August.
pdf>, 4 July 2013.
4 As the IPCC automatically investigates all fatal shootings by police officers – Home Affairs Committee 
– Sixteenth Report, Policing Large Scale Disorder: Lessons from the disturbances of August 2011, House 
of Commons, December 2011, p. 5, at <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/
cmselect/cmhaff/1456/145602.htm>, 10 July 2013.
5 See L. Bridges, ‘Four Days in August: the UK Riots’, Race & Class, Vol. 54, No. 1 (2012), p. 2, at 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0306396812446564>; 5 Days in August. An Interim Report…, p. 41.
6 On this fact there are confused accounts: L. Bridges writes about the failure of either the police or 
the IPCC to directly contact and inform Mark Duggan’s parents of his death in the days immediately 
following his killing (p. 3), D. Briggs mentions rumours that Duggan’s mother found out her son had died 
when she watched the news that evening (D. Briggs, ‘Frustrations, Urban Relations and Temptations: 
Contextualising the English Riots’ in idem (ed.), The English Riots of 2011. A Summer of Discontent, 
Hook 2012, p. 36), while the Interim Report states that on the evening of the 4th August members of 
the family that had attended the police cordon were informed of the death of Mark Duggan by family 
liaison officers for the Metropolitan Police (p. 40). There has been a separate investigation of the IPCC 
following Mark Duggan’s family complaint on the lack of proper contact which upheld the complaint, 
though also admitting mismatching accounts on behalf of the police forces and some of the Duggan’s 
family members. See Statement by IPCC Commissioner Rachel Cerfontyne in relation to Duggan family 
complaint, IPCC, 29 February 2012, at <http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/news/Pages/pr_290212_duggan.
aspx>, 11 July 2013.
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After a few hours of negotiations and waiting, rumours of a teenage girl confronting 
the police line began to spread. Soon the violence broke out.
The tense situation following Mark Duggan’s death was worsened by the confusion 
over the actual incident. The initial media reports informed about the exchange of fire, 
with an active participation of Duggan himself.7 It was not until Tuesday, 9 August that 
the IPCC stated that the two shots on the scene were fired by the policemen.8 On Friday 
12 August, after the riots ended the IPCC openly admitted that they might have misled 
the journalists in suggesting the exchange of fire between Duggan and the police.9
Shortly after Saturday, rioting started to spread across the country, reaching various 
parts of London (from Sunday on), and subsequently affecting other towns and cities 
in different parts of England (from Monday on). The main regions and cities affected 
(apart from London) were Birmingham, Bristol, Greater Manchester, Leicester, Liver-
pool (Merseyside) and Nottingham.10 The last event (in terms of rioting) mentioned in 
the Interim Report of the Riots, Communities and Victims Panel (called from now on 
the Interim Report) took place on Thursday, 11 August in Banbury (Oxfordshire).11 
It is estimated that altogether 66 local areas were affected, with 31 of them reporting 
more than forty crimes each.12 During this period more than 5 thousand crimes were 
committed, the majority of them (68%) taking place in London districts. There were 
5 fatal casualties: Richard Mannington Bowes (died as a result of serious injuries in 
Ealing), Trevor Ellis (shot in his car in Croydon13) and Haroon Jahan, Shahzad Ali and 
Abdul Musavir (run over by a car in Birmingham14).The total cost of the riots was esti-
mated to exceed half a billion pounds.15
Between 13 and 15 thousand people took part in rioting, while more than 4 thousand 
were subsequently arrested. According to the data provided by the Ministry of Justice,16 
7 J. Jones, ‘August 2011: A Riot of Our Own’, International Socialism, no. 132 (2011), at <http://isj.org.
uk/august -2011 -a -riot -of -our -own/>, pp. 1 -32. See also D. Briggs, ‘Frustrations…’, pp. 36 -38.
8 Home Affairs Committee – Sixteenth Report, Policing Large Scale Disorde…, p. 5..
9 5 Days in August. An Interim report…, p. 40.
10 An Overview of Recorded Crimes and Arrests Resulting from Disorder Events in August 2011, Gov.
uk, 24 October 2011, at <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/an -overview -of -recorded-
-crimes -and -arrests -resulting -from -disorder -events -in -august -2011>, 11 July 2013; also D. Briggs, 
‘Introduction’ in idem (ed.), The English Riots…, pp. 16 -18. More information is presented in the 
chart in the Annex to this paper.
11 5 Days in August. An Interim report…, pp. 20 -23.
12 These estimations are based on the Home Office data, counting the areas in which 10 police forces […] 
experienced 20 or more riot related crimes – An Overview of Recorded Crimes…, p. 24. See the Annex for 
the table presenting the list of those 31 areas along with the number of crimes.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., p. 6.
16 Statistical bulletin on the public disorder of 6th to 9th August 2011 – September 2012 update, Ministry 
of Justice, 13 September 2012, at <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/219665/august -public -disorder -stats -bulletin -130912.pdf>, 10 July 2013.
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slightly over three thousand were actually brought before the courts.17 It is only a frac-
tion of all the rioters, yet we might assume that it gives valuable information on some of 
the most “active” ones. Most of them were male (89%) and relatively young, as 95% were 
younger than 40. Most of them (78%) had a previous caution or conviction, based on 
the data stored on the Police National Computer available for 91% of defendants (2 826 
people).18 Most of the defendants were from the London region (72%), 11% from West 
Midlands, 8% from Greater Manchester, 3% from Merseyside (Liverpool), 2% from Not-
tingham and 4% from other parts of England.19
It is important to bear in mind the character of these riots in terms of the commit-
ted crimes. Most of them were so called “acquisitive crimes”, including burglary, at-
tempted burglary, robbery, and theft and handling offences20, which accounted for 50% 
of all the crimes. 36% were crimes involving criminal damage (directed at buildings and 
vehicles, including acts of arson), while 7% were constituted by violent offences. How-
ever, these proportions varied from one place to another, justifying the statements that 
August riots were in fact different phenomena in different cities and even in different parts 
of the same city.21 In the three areas where most of the crimes took place, i.e. Greater 
London (area covered by the Metropolitan Police Service), West Midlands and Greater 
Manchester, acquisitive crimes were the most common, unlike in all the other (seven) 
areas where criminal damage dominated22.
READING THE RIOTS
As underlined in official reports, there was no single cause of the riots and there is no 
single solution.23 The link between deprivation and rioting has, however, been widely 
explored. The Interim Report pointed out that 70% of defendants brought to courts 
17 Ministry of Justice gave the number of 3103 for all the people brought before the courts, out of which 
457 persons were still awaiting the final outcome [data as of 10th August 2012], 508 have been dismissed 
or acquitted, and 2138 people have been actually sentenced. See Public disorder of 6th -9th August 2011 
statistical tables – September 2012, Gov.uk, 13 September 2012, at <https://www.gov.uk/government/
publications/statistical -bulletin -on -the -public -disorder -of -6th -9th -august -2011–2>, 10 July 2013.
18 Some authors, however, warn against treating this data as a representative picture of rioters, stating 
that it might have just been “easier for police to identify and arrest those with prior convictions”. See 
B. Bradford, J. Jackson, ‘When Trust Is Lost: the British and their Police after the Tottenham Riots’,
Books and Ideas, 8 November 2011, at <http://www.booksandideas.net/When -Trust -is -Lost.html>, 
5 August 2013.
19 Public disorder of 6th -9th August 2011 statistical tables…
20 An Overview of Recorded Crimes… 
21 Home Affairs Committee – Sixteenth Report, Policing Large Scale Disorder…, p. 5.
22 An Overview of Recorded Crimes…, p. 4. See table 2 in Annex for the presentation of the 15 local areas 
where the highest number of crimes happened, arranged by the type of crime.
23 5 Days in August. An Interim Report…, p. 7. Compare with ‘A single explanation of the riots cannot 
be applied across all localities’ in G. Morrell et al., The August riots in England. Understanding the 
involvement of young people, October 2011, prepared for the Cabinet Office, NatCen, p. 25, at <https://
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lived in the most deprived areas (postcodes) of England,24 with young defendants also 
coming disproportionately from poorer households.25 Out of 66 local areas that were af-
fected by rioting, thirty were in the top quarter of the most deprived English areas.26 
In addition, researchers commented on exceptions such as Bradford or Sheffield27 that 
are also among the most deprived areas, but were not affected by the riots, or St. Albans 
which is situated among the least deprived areas and still experienced some form of dis-
order.28 The correlation between higher statistics in crime and problems with employ-
ment was also noted. Some scholars even seemed to blame the collapse of the welfare 
state for the anger and rage of the youth.29
The role of the police was also underlined, pointing out that the perception of police 
forces unable to contain rioting in Tottenham could have helped unrest to further spread 
out and encourage people to take part in riots.30 Talking about the role of the police, it is 
important to distinguish two moments, the first one – before the riots, with the police in-
volved in Mark Duggan’s death and (mis)handling the communication with Duggan’s31 
family, and the second one – during the riots, where the lack of feeling of police presence 
deepened the frustration and the feeling of abandonment of many communities. As we 
read in the Interim Report, all the seriously affected communities felt that police numbers were 
not high enough and that the police did not act quickly enough to engage with the rioters.32
Axel Klein33 expanded on this view, analysing police services in 2011 in the perspec-
tive of spending cuts, announced by the government.34 Though some criticised the de-
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/60531/The_20August_ 
20Riots_20in_20England_20_pdf__201mb_.pdf>, 15 July 2013.
24 Data released by the Ministry of Justice stated that 64 per cent of 10 -17 year olds for whom matched 
data were available lived in one of the 20 per cent most deprived areas whilst only three per cent lived 
in one of the 20 per cent least deprived areas – Statistical bulletin on the public disorder of 6th to 9th 
August 2011 – October update, Ministry of Justice, 24 October 2011, p. 5, at <https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/217807/august -public -disorder -stats-
-bulletin -241011.pdf>, 17 July 2013.
25 As measured by the higher eligibility for Free School Meals. See ibid., p. 27.
26 5 Days in August. An Interim report…, p. 11.
27 What is interesting in the case of Sheffield, is that the local participants of the discussion groups led 
by G. Morrell’s team, commented on differences “between rich and poor” which were less visible in 
Sheffield than in London, which might have stopped young local inhabitants from rioting. See G. 
Morrell et al., The August riots in England…, p. 7.
28 5 Days in August. An Interim report…, p. 60.
29 T. Slater, ‘From “Criminality” to Marginality: Rioting against a Broken State’, Human Geography, Vol. 
4, No. 3 (2011).
30 5 Days in August. An Interim report…, pp. 11 -12.
31 Ibid., p. 11.
32 Ibid., p. 13.
33 . Klein, ‘Policing as a Causal Factor – a Fresh View on Riots and Social Unrest’, Safer Communities, 
Vol. 11, No. 1 (2012), pp. 17 -23, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/17578041211200074>.
34 According to the October 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review. More information on that can be 
found in British press, as well as in HMIC reports, such as Adapting to Austerity. A review of police force 
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cisions on cuts in police budget, using rioting as an example to prove their point, Klein 
raised concerns over inappropriate (rather than under -resourced) policing. He claimed 
that riots break out when protesters feel that an established customary or higher right has 
been violated, particularly where they regard the social order as being inherently unjust35 
and, in such a case, heavy policing would not have a calming effect. It is an interesting 
argument, taking into account Klein’s controversial assumption that all public violence 
is sustained by a legitimating discourse36 as the crowd is motivated by the feeling of injus-
tice, happening on a regular, even systematic basis. Though Klein admitted that once 
the unrest breaks out, the primary intentions tend to lose their significance, the violence 
that was raised to rectify the breach runs out of control, self interest takes over, and the 
prime motive become enrichment and entertainment,37 he posed an important question 
about the extent to which the feeling of injustice triggered by Mark Duggan’s death or, 
in broader terms, police relations and activities, played a role in the August riots.38
Analysts emphasized the role of social media as well, as they proved crucial in fa-
cilitating people’s self -organizing both for destructive and community -oriented actions. 
Stephanie Alice Baker commented on that issue, saying that certain commentators per-
ceived new social media to be the catalyst of the disorder.39 While she admitted the un-
precedented scale and speed with which rioting spread across the country, the process 
undoubtedly accelerated by the use of social media platforms, Baker argued for the need 
of a thorough analysis of the question of how the media were actually used in order 
also to counteract the violence. She rejected the position of technological determinism, 
showing the examples of those who have consciously decided not to get involved into 
rioting and also those who organised themselves to resist the riots, as she wrote, whether 
their involvement took the form of disseminating information, ensuring public safety, pre-
venting others from rioting, fundraising, or in the clean -up operations that followed.40
Another frequent analytical pattern was to blame the consumer culture. For instance, 
as we read in David Moxon’s article, in order to be properly comprehended, the “riots” of 
August 2011 must be located in the context of an increasingly consumerist society.41 What 
and authority preparedness for the 2011/12 -14/15 CSR period, HMIC, July 2011, at <http://www.
hmic.gov.uk/media/adapting -to -austerity -20110721.pdf>, 30 July 2011, or Policing in austerity: One 
year on, HMIC, July 2012, at <http://www.hmic.gov.uk/media/policing -in -austerity -one -year -on.
pdf>, 30 July 2013.
35 A. Klein, ‘Policing as a Causal Factor…’, p. 17.
36 Ibid., p. 18.
37 Ibid., p. 21.
38 Compare R. Prasad, ‘The Riots Were “a Sort of Revenge” against the Police’ in D. Roberts (ed.), 
Reading the Riots. Investigating England’s Summer of Disorder, London 2011, Kindle Edition 
(Guardian Shorts).
39 SA Baker, ‘Policing the Riots: New Social Media as Recruitment, Resistance, and Surveillance’ in D. 
Briggs (ed.), The English Riots…
40 Ibid., p. 232.
41 D. Moxon, ‘Consumer Culture and the 2011 “Riots”’, Sociological Research Online, Vol. 16, No. 4 
(2011), p. 2.
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Moxon suggested is that rioting illustrated in fact conformity to the underlying values of 
consumer culture.42 Although he noticed similarities between the events in Tottenham 
and the previous outbreaks of social unrest motivated by the long -standing racial tensions 
between London residents and the Met [Metropolitan police]43 (the theme which is fur-
ther explored in the third part of this article), when he discussed later “moments” of the 
rioting, called respectively an “acquisitive” and a “nihilistic” one, Moxon stated clearly 
that they should be explained in terms of consumer culture.44 The acquisitive moment was 
characterized by massive looting of stores with electrical goods, sports equipment and 
clothing, and was accordingly labelled as an angry response of those socially deprived si-
multaneously showing their thorough inclusion in the consumerist dream.45 Furthermore, 
goods that were sought after were seen as a symbol of high material status, hence a sign of 
a desired identity. The nihilistic moment characterised by general disorder46 was analysed 
by Moxon also in relation to the consumer culture, as according to him rioters sought 
“fleeting consumer “experiences”47 and excitement via creating mayhem.48
Furthermore, the Interim Report distinguished between five types49 of riots’ par-
ticipants which were: (1) organised criminals […] (2) violent aggressors […] (3) “late 
night shoppers” […] (4) opportunists […] (5) spectators,50 each type having different moti-
vations and aims. Organised criminals seemed to be the most prepared of all the types, 
mainly interested in stealing high value goods. Violent aggressors, although smaller in 
numbers, were responsible for the most serious crimes against the police and for cases or 
arson.51. “Late night shoppers”, also mainly interested in looting, were less organized, 
as they were directly reacting to the news obtained via social media platforms. Op-
portunists and spectators were brought into the event through curiosity or a sense of 
excitement,52 yet later on opportunists turned into looters, possibly motivated by the 
lack of proper police response.
Respondents of the research undertaken by the Panel named several reasons that 
could have driven people into rioting, such as disillusion with the behaviour of politi-
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., p. 3.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid., p. 2.
46 Ibid., p. 1.
47 Ibid., p. 3.
48 Moxon also explores the issue of antagonistic relations between people with similar social background 
and a level of deprivation, rivals in the brutal competition for scarce resources and status, calling this 
phenomenon a Hobbesian war of all against all, yet this theme goes beyond the scope of this paper. See 
ibid., p. 3.
49 These were more of the “ideal type” characters as it is noted in the Interim Report itself that many 
rioters fit into more than one of the types of rioter […] and some may have moved from one type to another 
during the course of a riot or several riots – 5 Days in August. An Interim report…, p. 35.
50 Ibid., p.11.
51 Ibid., p. 37.
52 Ibid., pp. 36 -37.
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cal elites (referring to the issues of Bankers bonuses and MPs’ expenses53), or tensions be-
tween police and some of the communities (mostly Black and Asian men) around the 
issue of “stop and search”.
Another piece of research into the involvement of young people in the riots has 
been completed by Gareth Morrell, Sara Scott, Di McNeish and Stephen Webster.54 
There we find an alternative typology of young people from the areas affected by riots, 
who were divided into four broad categories: (a) “watchers”, (b) “rioters”, (c) “looters”, 
and (d) “non -involved”. It varies from the typology discussed two paragraphs above as 
it includes people who did not get involved in the riots themselves.
Researchers from Morrell’s team analysed motivational factors, in an attempt at 
answering the core question […]: “Why did young people get involved in the riots”?55 
They listed three main factors: firstly, rioting was perceived as something exciting to 
do;56 secondly, there was the thrill of getting [so called] free stuff57 – as the riots cre-
ated the opportunity to get hold of high technology equipment that some of those 
teenagers could not have afforded otherwise; finally, it was a chance to get back at 
police,58 whether it was motivated by the death of Mark Duggan (in Tottenham and 
other parts of London) or was more generally related to local anti -police sentiments 
and grievances.
Still, as mere motivational factors were not sufficient to push people into rioting, 
researchers examined other situational and societal factors. Thinking of a situation in 
a given location, much depended on the context: whether a particular young person 
could see others looting shops and getting away with it,59 or how her or his friends (or 
other significant others) were behaving at that time. It was also important to include 
more personal factors: previous criminal history, attitudes towards those with power and 
authority60 and individual prospects and aspirations, the feeling of having something to 
lose61 like a job or educational achievements. The importance of family and communi-
ty links was emphasized. Finally, the material circumstances were mentioned, as it ap-
53 Ibid., p. 12. More information on these issues can be found in British press. See ‘Bank Bonuses “To 
Run to Billions in 2011”’, BBC News Online, 7 January 2011, at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
business -12131092>, 6 August 2013, and (on MP’s expenses scandal from 2009) ‘Cabinet Expenses 
under Scrutiny’, BBC News Online, 8 May 2009, at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/
politics/8039108.stm>, 6 August 2013.
54 The research included interviews with 206 young people in five affected areas (Tottenham, Peckam, 
Clapham Junction, Birmingham and Salford), as well as discussions and focus groups both in affected 
and non -affected areas (Firth Park, Sheffield and Poplar, East London) in which 105 people took part. 
See G. Morrell et al., The August riots in England…, Technical Appendix, pp. 55 -63.
55 Ibid., p. 4.
56 Ibid., p. 5.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid., p. 6.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid., p. 7.
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peared that many of those young people seemed to be struggling in order to maintain 
themselves, being affected by the recent cuts in youth services provision. Exposed to all 
these factors, young people needed to make a decision whether to get involved in riot-
ing or not. According to the research quoted, at least some of them helped themselves 
by asking two fundamental questions: about the ethical dimension of their actions and 
about the risks such actions were connected with.
THE qUESTIONS OF RACE AND ETHNICITY62
Certainly, the ethnocultural perspective has not been a dominant one. Most scholars 
and commentators (including politicians) talked about the consumer culture, depriva-
tion and alienation, criminality, and new ways of communication (social media). How-
ever, as stated by John Solomos,63 it is important not to lose sight of the questions link-
ing the issues of race and ethnicity with the events of August 2011. Solomos argued 
that although the lens of race alone64 cannot be considered sufficient to analyse the riots, 
there are certain links and similarities between the events in Tottenham and the previ-
ous outbreaks of social disorder that point to issues of race and policing.65
It should not be forgotten that Tottenham has had the history of tensions between 
police and the local communities that often lead to social unrest, as it happened in 
1985, when a black woman, Cynthia Jarrett, […] died of a stroke after being pushed over 
by the police during a search of her home.66 In a striking analogy with events of August 
2011, after her death local members organized a protest at the very same police station, 
in Tottenham, and a violent confrontation took place. David Lammy, a local politi-
cian, Member of Parliament for Tottenham, when talking about troubled history of 
this area, also mentioned67 Joy Gardner, an illegal immigrant from Jamaica who died 
in 1993 after the police raided her flat in order to deport her along with her son in 
62 This article does not cover the complex questions of cultural factors that might or might not have 
influenced the decision to take part in rioting, limiting its scope to the questions of race and ethnicity. 
It should be however underlined that any attempt at identifying belonging to any particular ethnic 
group with belonging to (or having) any particular culture cannot be read as in line with opinions and 
statements expressed in this paper. 
63 J. Solomos, ‘Race, Rumours and Riots: Past, Present and Future’, Sociological Research Online, Vol. 16, 
No. 4, (2011), pp. 1 -6.
64 Ibid., p. 2.
65 He also mentions the relevance of questions about race in context of issues of poverty, unemployment, 
education, as well as political inclusion and exclusion. See ibid., pp. 3 -4.
66 L. Bridges, ‘Four Days in August…’, p. 2. Other reports say that she had a heart attack – see L. Fekete, 
‘Total Policing: Reflections from the Frontline’, Race & Class, Vol. 54, No. 3 (2013), p. 67, at <http://
dx.doi.org/10.1177/0306396812464159>.
67 D. Lammy, ‘Statement Q 253’, quoted in: Home Affairs Committee – Sixteenth Report, Policing Large 
Scale Disorder…, p. 6. It is important to note that David Lammy distanced himself from highlighting 
analogies between the riots of 1985 and 2011. On that issue, see L. Bridges, ‘Four Days in August…’, 
pp. 4 -5.
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Crouch End, North London68 (Haringey, the same borough as Tottenham), and Roger 
Sylvester,69 a black man, who died in Tottenham in 1999 after being restrained by the 
police officers.
Furthermore, it might be also valuable to look at the ethnicity of those who took 
part in these events. However, one has to be cautious when interpreting this data, as 
they reflect the ethnicity only of those who were brought to court (3 103 people) and 
in 13% of cases ethnic belonging was neither stated nor recorded.70 Moreover, some 
commentators point to the fact that ethnic minority members are more likely to be ar-
rested than others.71
41% of those arrested and brought to court were identified as White, 39% as Black, 
12% as belonging to the mixed ethnic group, 7% as Asian, and 2% as Chinese.72 Given 
the ethnic composition of England and Wales, as revealed in the last Census,73 there is 
a visible overrepresentation of “rioters” from Black and Mixed communities. However, 
two additional factors must be taken into account: local levels of ethnic diversity in the 
areas affected by the riots, and different age structures of various British ethnic groups. 
Looking at the local areas most affected by the riots, we might say that generally they 
are more ethnically diverse than the average population. Out of 15 areas with the high-
est number of crimes, 11 had less than 65% of inhabitants belonging to the White cate-
gory.74 Linking that to the scale of deprivation mentioned earlier, we might assume that 
some of the communities from which the rioters recruited might have felt alienated 
from the mainstream, relatively more prosperous society.
68 More information on Joy Gardner’s story can be found in British press, see for example, N. Cohen, 
‘Why Did Joy Gardner Die?: It Should Not Surprise Anyone that an Illegal Immigrant’s Death Can 
Cause a National Scandal’, The Independent Online, 23 October 2011, at <http://www.independent.
co.uk/news/uk/why -did -joy -gardner -die -it -should -not -surprise -anyone -that -an -illegal -immigrants-
-death -can -cause -a -national -scandal -nick -cohen -reports -1459872.html>, 26 July 2013.
69 More information on Roger Sylvester’s story can be found in British press, see for example, ‘No 
Punishment for Sylvester’s Death’, BBC News Online, 8 August 2007, at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/uk_news/england/london/6937410.stm>, 26 July 2013. 
70 Public disorder of 6th -9th August 2011 statistical tables… Table 1.12 shows that the ethnicity of 395 
persons was neither stated nor recorded.
71 H. Muir, Y. Adegoke, ‘Were the Riots about Race?’ in D. Roberts (ed.), Reading the Riots…
72 Statistical bulletin… September 2012 update, p. 4.
73 86% of the population of England and Wales was constituted by White (British and non -British), 7,5% 
by Asian, 3,3% by Black and 2,2% by people from Mixed Ethnic Groups. See Proportion of ethnic 
minorities in the United Kingdom population, Census 2011: KS201EW – Ethnic group, at <http://www.
nomisweb.co.uk/census/2011/KS201EW/view/2092957703>, 26 July 2013. More information on 
ethnic categories used in the United Kingdom can be found in M. Kułakowska, ‘Rozwiązania dotyczące 
przynależności etnicznej i narodowej przyjęte w spisach powszechnych Polski i Wielkiej Brytanii’ in 
S. Jackiewicz (ed.), Kwestie spisowe a tożsamość etniczno -kulturowa autochtonicznych mniejszości na
pograniczach, Białystok 2012. From the perspective of this paper, the differences in ethnic categories
between those used in Census 2011 and those used by the Ministry of Justice (eg. the Chinese treated as 
a separate group vs. including them within the Asian group) seem to be negligible.
74 NOMIS Official Labour Market Statistics Website provides data on ethnicity for chosen local areas. 
See <http://www.nomisweb.co.uk/census/2011/ks201ew>.
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The theme of policing was analysed briefly in the second part of this article, but it is 
worth mentioning here, in the context of the tensions between ethnic minority groups 
and the police, one of the concerns raised in the context of the August riots, which is 
the police practice of “stop and search”.75 In the Interim Report we read that these pow-
ers are regularly used inappropriately, referencing […] the regularity of searches and the 
circumstances in which certain people are targeted.76 A formal investigation was launched 
by the Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), with a report being pub-
lished on 9 July 2013.77 The HMIC was critical about the examined practices, stating 
in its official press release that the police use of stop and search powers is too often ineffec-
tive in tackling crime and procedurally incorrect, thereby threatening the legitimacy of the 
police.78 What seems crucial from the perspective of this article, are the significant dis-
crepancies in the perception of fairness of “stop and search” between the members of 
certain communities. While 51% of the respondents agreed that the police’s use of stop 
and search in their county/city makes them feel safer,79 such an opinion was expressed by 
53% of those from the white British group and only 40% of the black and minority eth-
nic groups. 70% of the researched group agreed that certain groups of people in society are 
likely to be stopped and searched more often than others in the UK80 (which matches the 
data from the official statistics81), and while only 31% of those who agreed believed that 
to be due to police discrimination against these groups, this number increased to55% 
among non -white respondents.82
CONClUSIONS
The question of the applicability of an ethnocultural perspective – as analysed in this 
paper – could be paraphrased in another way – “were these race riots?”
75 More information on that practice, including when and how it can be used, can be found at the 
governmental website – see Police powers to stop and search: your rights, GOV.uk, at <https://www.
gov.uk/police -powers -to -stop -and -search -your -rights>, 25 July 2013.
76 5 Days in August. An Interim report…, p. 71.
77 See Stop and Search Powers: Are the police using them effectively and fairly?, HMIC, 9 July 2013, at 
<http://www.hmic.gov.uk/publication/stop -and -search -powers -20130709/>, 25 July 2013; see also 
the main findings summary captured in Stop and Search Report, April 2013, HMIC, at <http://www.
justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/media/stop -and -search -survey -summary.pdf>, 25 July 2013.
78 HMIC Press Release #020/2013, at <http://www.hmic.gov.uk/news/releases -2013/0202013 -hmic-
-finds -the -police -use -of -stop -and -search -powers -is -too -often -ineffective/>, 25 July 2013.
79 Stop and Search Report…, p. 6.
80 Ibid., p. 11.
81 Statistics show for example that Black people were stopped and searched 7 times more than White 
people in 2009/10” – Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System 2010. A Ministry of Justice 
publication under Section 95 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991, Ministry of Justice, October 2011, p. 38, 
at <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/219967/stats-
-race -cjs -2010.pdf>, 5 August 2013.
82 Out of those who have agreed with the discussed statement.
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Looking at the official reports, they are quite unanimous in denying this explanation. 
In the Interim Report we read that the authors do not believe that these were race riots,83 
as they differed considerably from riots in previous years such as 1981 and 1985.84 The au-
thors also stated openly that – apart from the events that took place in Tottenham – the 
primary motivation for rioting was theft.85 The previously discussed research into the in-
volvement of young people86 likewise did not devote much consideration to the question 
of race; instead the authors mentioned family, community and cultural factors.
However, Reading the Riots, prepared by Guardian and London School of Econom-
ics, contained one article devoted directly to this issue, with Hugh Muir and Yemisi 
Adegoke asking ‘Were the Riots about Race?’87 The first point they made is that the 
events of August 2011 were not disturbances resulting from conflict between races.88 Still, 
they quoted black people – respondents of the interviews89 conducted by the research 
team – referring to the feelings of discrimination, unfairness and even hopelessness.
It seems proper to refer to one more piece of research, the article by Ben Bradford 
and Jonathan Jackson, ‘When Trust Is Lost: the British and their Police after the Tot-
tenham Riots’,90 where the authors analysed the detrimental effect that improper and 
unfair police behaviour has on the perception of the legitimacy of the police force with-
in marginalized and excluded communities. Though the themes of legitimacy and, in 
broader terms, trust in British political system, go beyond the scope of this paper, it ap-
pears that the notion of police behaving fairly or unfairly towards certain communities 
is crucial in terms of proper understanding of the social disorder of August 2011. If we 
refer again to Reading of Riots, the article by Raekha Prasad,91 it underlines exactly the 
same theme. 85% of the respondents (active rioters) interviewed within the Guardian/
LSE research project92 stated “policing” as an important factor contributing to riot-
ing, and many called the whole riots “anti -police riots”. There had been recurring com-
plaints about discriminatory policies such as the previously discussed “stop and search”, 
with many respondents feeling that the police treated them like criminals regardless of 
83 5 Days in August. An Interim report…, p. 13. The final report of the Riots Communities and 
Victims Panel, published in March 2012, focused more on building social and economic resilience, 
and preventing future riots than analysing the deep causes of the disorder, mostly referring to the 
Interim Report for data and the context information. See After the riots. The final report of the Riots 
Communities and Victims Panel, Riots Communities and Victims Panel, March 2012, at <http://
webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121003195935/http://riotspanel.independent.gov.uk/wp-
-content/uploads/2012/03/Riots -Panel -Final -Report1.pdf>, 30 July 2013.
84 5 Days in August. An Interim report…, p. 55.
85 Ibid.
86 G. Morrell et al., The August riots in England…, pp. 33 -48.
87 H. Muir, Y. Adegoke, ‘Were the Riots…’, pp. 47 -50.
88 Ibid., p. 48. 
89 As mentioned before, researchers conducted 270 interviews with people who took part in the riots.
90 B. Bradford, J. Jackson, ‘When Trust Is Lost…’
91 R. Prasad, ‘The Riots…’, pp. 29 -33.
92 Ibid., p. 30.
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what they have done.93 In this context, it will not be surprising that the highest level of 
mistrust was found among black respondents.
In conclusion, though it would be a mistake to label the social disorder of August 
2011 as “race riots”, the complex ethnic and racial relations, mostly between certain 
marginalized communities and the police should be taken into account in order to 
properly understand the events of summer 2011.. The feelings of trust and fairness 
might need generations to flourish in view of the fact that antipathy and fear seemed to 
have been growing for decades.
ANNEx
Fig. 1. Timeline of disorder by police force area: number of crimesrecorded by the police94
Table 1. Local areas affected along with the number of recorded crimes95
Police Force  
area
lower tier  




Somerset City of Bristol Bristol city centre, St Pauls 57
Greater 
Manchester Manchester
Manchester city centre, Cheetham Hill, 
Harpurhey, Blackley, Gorton 386
93 Ibid., p. 30.
94 Source An Overview of Recorded Crimes…, p. 8.
95 Based on Data Tables – An Overview of Recorded Crimes… Own adaptation of the tables A1 and A5. 
The table includes crimes occurring between 00:00 on 6 August and 07:29 on 11 August and data are 
shown for areas within the ten police force areas where disorder was most extensive [Table A5 Description]. 
Areas with more than 200 crimes are highlighted in grey.
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Police Force  
area
lower tier  




Manchester Salford Pendleton, Broughton, Eccles 188
Leicestershire City of Leicester Leicester city centre 90
Merseyside Liverpool Liverpool city centre, Toxteth, Wavertree 146
Metropolitan Croydon Croydon town centre, Thornton Heath, Addiscombe 430
Metropolitan Southwark Camberwell, Peckham 314
Metropolitan Haringey Tottenham, Hornsey, Wood Green 303
Metropolitan Ealing Ealing, West Ealing 279
Metropolitan Lewisham Lewisham, Deptford, Catford 213
Metropolitan Lambeth Brixton, Streatham, West Norwood 209
Metropolitan Enfield Enfield, Edmonton 182
Metropolitan Hackney Hackney, Dalston 172
Metropolitan Greenwich Woolwich, Eltham 156
Metropolitan Newham East Ham, West Ham 152
Metropolitan Wandsworth Clapham Junction, Tooting 150
Metropolitan Waltham Forest Walthamstow, Leyton, Chingford 129
Metropolitan Tower Hamlets Bethnal Green 103
Metropolitan Bromley Bromley town centre, Orpington 84
Metropolitan Redbridge Ilford 74
Metropolitan City of Westminster Bayswater, Marylebone 71
Metropolitan Camden Camden Town 59
Metropolitan Islington Holloway Road 58
Metropolitan Barnet Hendon 50
Metropolitan Merton Merton 48
Metropolitan Barking and Dagenham Barking 48
Metropolitan Kensington and Chelsea Portobello Road 48
West Midlands Birmingham Ladywood, Perry Barr 363
West Midlands City of Wolverhampton Wolverhampton city centre 81
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Police Force  
area
lower tier  
local Authority Specific areas affected
Total recorded 
crime
West Midlands Sandwell West Bromwich, Smethwick 46




Table 2. Disorder -related recorded crime by local authority area, by type of crime [%] 






























Croydon Metropolitan 430 75 17 2 3 3
Manchester Greater Manchester 386 48 39 3 6 4
Birmingham West Midlands 363 58 36 2 4 1
Southwark Metropolitan 314 75 18 0 6 2
Haringey Metropolitan 303 51 37 1 8 3
Ealing Metropolitan 279 46 39 5 5 4
Lewisham Metropolitan 213 56 31 2 11 0
Lambeth Metropolitan 209 62 21 1 12 4
Salford Greater Manchester 188 41 29 2 26 3
Enfield Metropolitan 182 32 53 2 5 7
Hackney Metropolitan 172 49 30 1 12 8
Greenwich Metropolitan 156 63 28 1 6 2
Newham Metropolitan 152 51 32 5 9 4
Wandsworth Metropolitan 150 59 33 1 4 2
Liverpool Merseyside 146 16 73 8 3 1
96 Based on Data Tables – An Overview of Recorded Crimes… Own adaptation of the table A1 and table 2. It 
includes crimes occurring between 00.00 on 6 August and 07.29 on 11 August. “Acquisitive” offences include 
burglary, theft, handling stolen goods and robbery. “Criminal damage” offences include criminal damage 
and arson. “Disorder” offences include violent disorder and public order offences. “Violence against the person” 
offences include murder, wounding, grievous bodily harm, assault and possession of weapons. “Other” offences 
include drugs offences, driving offences and a range of other miscellaneous offences [Table 2 Description]. Areas 
where acquisitive crime constitutes more than 50% of all the crimes recorded are highlighted in grey.
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No %* No % No % No % No % No % No %
White 
– British 503 26% 107 36% 22 35% 179 73% 67 73% 66 73% 944 35%
White – Irish 25 1% 2 1% – – 2 1% – – – – 29 1%
White 
– Other 109 6% 3 1% 1 2% 9 4% – – 3 3% 125 5%
Black 
– Caribbean 425 22% 65 22% 11 17% 5 2% 1 1% 8 9% 515 19%
Black 
– African 245 13% 17 6% – – 17 7% 3 3% 2 2% 284 10%
Black – Other 210 11% 18 6% 10 16% 4 2% 8 9% 2 2% 252 9%
Asian 
– Indian 21 1% 8 3% – – – – – – 1 1% 30 1%
Asian 
– Pakistani 33 2% 20 7% – – 3 1% – – 1 1% 57 2%
Asian 
– Bangladeshi 22 1% 6 2% – – – – – – – – 28 1%
Asian 




134 7% 30 10% 16 25% 15 6% 3 3% 6 7% 204 8%
White and 
Black African 30 2%  –  – – – 5 2% – – – – 35 1%
White and 




60 3% 6 2% 2 3% 1 0% 4 4% 1 1% 74 3%
Chinese 3 0%  –  – – – 1 0% – – – – 4 0%
Other 45 2% 4 1% 1 2% 2 1% 3 3% 1 1% 56 2%
Not stated/
recorded 324 38 1 5 1 26 395 
Total 2 246 100% 334 100% 64 100% 249 100% 93 100% 117 100% 3 103 100%
* Of all those whose ethnicity was recorded.
97 Based on Public disorder of 6th -9th August 2011 statistical tables – September 2012… Merged tables 1.9a 
and 1.9b.
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